Introduction
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "effectively advisory" in order to cure the Sixth Amendment violation created by requiring judges to follow the Guidelines. 1 The Court directed district judges to "consider" the Guidelines, along with the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instructed the courts of appeals to review district court sentencing decisions for "unreasonableness" "guid [ed] " by "Section 3553(a) ['s] . . . numerous factors." 2 Justice Scalia was skeptical of the courts' ability to review sentences for unreasonableness, asserting that "no one knows . . . how advisory Guidelines and 'unreasonableness' review will function in practice." 3 In the two years following the Court's decision, there have been significant debates in the lower courts over the role that the Guidelines should continue to play in sentencing determinations, and in appellate review of sentences for unreasonableness. Seven courts of appeals have adopted a position giving the advisory Guidelines the preeminent role. These courts hold that sentences within a correctly calculated advisory-Guidelines range are presumptively reasonable. 4 Five courts of appeals have declined to adopt this explicit presumption but have given significant deference to the Guidelines. 5 These rulings have sent district courts a strong signal that applying the Guidelines range will likely insulate sentences from reversal. 6 Over time, it has become apparent that all of the courts of appeals are placing great weight on the Guidelines and, for the most part, using the Guidelines as the touchstone for unreasonableness review. In response, some district judges have suggested that the Guidelines remain effectively binding after Booker. 7 Indeed, the Sentencing Commission recently reported that in the six months through September 30, 2006 , district courts less frequently sentenced outside of the Guidelines. 8 A number of commentators have argued that adhering to the Guidelines in this fashion effectively substitutes the de jure mandatory regime held unconstitutional in Booker with a de facto mandatory system that solves none of the problems the Booker Court identified. 9 Critics have asserted that reasonableness review tethered to the Guidelines in this manner also contravenes Booker's command that courts "consider" all of the seven factors in Section 3553(a), not just the Guidelines, in fashioning sentences, as well as the statute's mandate to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to achieve the purposes of sentencing. 10 Some courts (and the government as a litigant) have responded that the Guidelines were crafted to take account of the other Section 3553(a) factors and have found little substance in the so-called parsimony provision. 11 The Sentencing Commission's own reports, however, indicate that it did not consider all of the Section 3553(a) factors (or even all four of the purposes of sentencing set forth in 3553(a)(2)). 12 Critics of the courts of appeals' singular focus on the Guidelines may draw some comfort from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Cunningham v. California, 13 striking down California's Determinate Sentencing Law. The California system was described by the dissenters as "indistinguishable in any constitutionally significant respect from the advisory Guidelines scheme that the Court approved in United States v. Booker." 14 As post-Booker doctrines developed, Professor Douglas Berman took note on his blog of the emerging pattern of appellate review and periodically attempted to place cases in various categories including the following: withinGuidelines sentences affirmed; above-Guidelines sentences affirmed; and below-Guidelines sentences reversed. 15 Circuit judges also occasionally acknowledged that, in general, courts of appeals were affirming withinand above-Guidelines sentences while reversing belowGuidelines sentences. 16 However, apart from this helpful, but anecdotal, evidence of the patterns of appellate reasonableness review, there was no comprehensive study compiling and analyzing courts of appeals' decisions to assess the practical impact on sentences of the doctrines they were developing. Even the United States Sentencing Commission, the agency charged with compiling, analyzing, and disseminating important sentencing data, has not undertaken to study reasonableness review in application.
As the circuits staked out different positions on reasonableness review, it became clear that at some point either Congress or the Supreme Court would need to intervene, in order to bring some uniformity to sentencing review. Then, on November 3, 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rita v. United States and Claiborne v. United States to address two main questions relating to the continuing role of the Guidelines post-Booker. The first (presented in Rita), whether a presumption of reasonableness for withinGuidelines sentences is consistent with Booker, has, as noted above, divided the circuits. If the answer to this question is no, it will once again significantly alter the sentencing process and review. Defendants will likely be able to demand a more comprehensive analysis of their individual circumstances in the district courts, and courts of appeals will need to ensure that all of the statutory factors have been considered in a reasoned sentencing determination that does not rely disproportionately on the Guidelines. If the Court rejects the presumption of reasonableness, its principal challenge will be to provide meaningful guidance on how to determine whether sentences are "reasonable."
The second main question (presented in Claiborne) is whether requiring a substantial variance from the Guidelines to be justified by extraordinary circumstances is consistent with Booker. The Court's answer will provide guidance on the extent of district courts' discretion to impose sentences both significantly higher and lower than the Guidelines suggest based on an assessment of the other sentencing factors.
I. NYCDL's Reasonableness Review Study
After certiorari was granted in Rita and Claiborne, counsel for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers ("NYCDL"), Latham & Watkins LLP, Professor Douglas Berman, and Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, began considering approaches to an amicus brief . 17 To fill the void of reasonableness review data-and to answer Justice Scalia's question about how reasonableness review functions in practice-we decided to undertake the task of compiling and analyzing all post-Booker applications of reasonableness review. NYCDL would, therefore, compile the first comprehensive review of reasonableness review in practice in the courts of appeals. The theory underlying the study was that data about the rates of reversal of above-, within-, and below-Guidelines sentences could potentially shed light on issues relevant to Rita and Claiborne. For example, the analysis could be relevant to whether a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences effectively undermined the parsimony provision-and the other Section 3553(a) factors that Booker commands both district and circuit courts to consider.
A. Constructing the Study
The first step involved deciding on search terms to enter into Westlaw. Based on the experience of the team of counsel, many of whom recently served as federal courts of appeals clerks, the first search terms constructed were as follows: Booker & Reasonab! Unreasonab!. 18 Counsel were also aware that as the courts of appeals continued to review sentencing appeals, they would occasionally dispense with a citation to Booker, often affirming sentences with little discussion or reference to case law, or instead preferring to cite circuit precedent. A second search was designed in an attempt to capture these, mostly unpublished, dispositions. The terms for this backup search were as follows: Sentenc! /3 Guideline /20 Reasonab! Unreasonab! (#Not /3 Reasonab!) & Da (Aft 1/11/2005) % Booker. These two searches collected more than seven thousand cases.
As counsel began reviewing cases, it became clear that a substantial number of the cases-in fact, a vast majority of all cases from 2005 19 -involved Booker issues other than reasonableness review. For example, most of the cases from 2005 involved whether a defendant who was sentenced pre-Booker was entitled to a remand for resentencing under the new advisory-Guidelines scheme. Counsel decided to further date-restrict the searches to all cases decided in 2006 through an end date of November 16, 2006 , approximately two weeks after the Court's grants of certiorari. Counsel felt that restricting the searches to these eleven months would provide the greatest yield of reasonableness review cases and the best evidence of reasonableness review in practice. The first search, restricted using these dates, returned approximately 2,800 cases, and the second approximately 250 cases.
A large team of attorneys divided the cases by circuit and began reviewing them and compiling information. The database included nine categories of information: (1) case name and citation; (2) type of crime; 20 (3) advisoryGuideline range; (4) sentence; (5) whether the sentence was within, above, or below the advisory range; (6) whether it was the government or the defendant that appealed; (7) whether the sentence was affirmed or reversed; (8) whether the government or the defendant prevailed in the appeal; and (9) if the sentence was vacated, whether the basis was procedural or substantive. Counsel encountered various challenges compiling and coding this information. To start, some of the courts of appeals' opinions neglected to mention certain information, such as the advisory-Guidelines range or the sentence. At times, however, the key piece of information-whether the sentence was within, above, or below the range-was not included. As a result, it became necessary in some instances to incur the significant cost-in terms of both time and money-to acquire the lower court sentencing memoranda or briefs, in order to ascertain pertinent information. Interestingly, it also became clear that, in some circuits, the courts were issuing near-uniform, cursory opinions with fill-in-the-blanks for the specific defendant's information. As the information was entered and the results started coming in circuit by circuit, a distinct pattern was apparent. We were not surprised at the results, because they were consistent with Professor Berman's anecdotal evidence; we were surprised, however, at how stark the pattern appeared.
B. Summary of Results
After filtering decisions not addressing reasonableness out of the 3,000 cases captured by the search terms, the final database comprised 1,515 cases. The results showed that in these 1,515 cases, the courts of appeals were reflexively deferential to the Guidelines-except when district courts imposed sentences above the Guidelines range. Virtually all of these sentences were affirmed, even though the vast majority of below-Guidelines sentences appealed by the government were reversed. Only 7 of 154 appeals of above-Guidelines sentences resulted in a sentence being reversed as unreasonably high. 21 On the other hand, a startling 60 of 71 below-Guidelines sentences appealed by the government were reversed as unreasonably low, giving the government an 84.5 percent success rate. Defendants were unable to win a single one of 138 appeals of belowGuidelines sentences. 22 The remaining 1,152 appeals involved within-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants. Of these sentences, only 16 were vacated as unreasonable. Fifteen of the 16, moreover, were reversed for procedural reasons-almost uniformly because the court of appeals found that the district court did not adequately explain its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed; only 1 out of 1,152 sentences (0.0868 percent) was found to be substantively unreasonable. These findings, NYCDL argued in its brief, send a message to district courts that discourages the exercise of thoughtful discretion in service to the full range of considerations Congress articulated in Section 3553(a).
This message, we found, was noticeably stronger in the circuits that have adopted a formal presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences. In these circuits-the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits-93 above-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants were captured by the database. Eighty-eight of these sentences were affirmed; only 5 were vacated as unreasonably high. Of the 51 below-Guidelines sentences appealed by the government, however, only 4 sentences were affirmed; 47 out of the 51 below-Guidelines sentences appealed by the government were reversed. Of the remaining 693 within-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants, only 7 were vacated-6 for procedural reasons and 1 because it was found substantively unreasonable by the Eighth Circuit. 23 Table 1 shows the circuit-by-circuit breakdown for these courts of appeals. The results in the circuits that have not adopted a formal presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences were not as pro-government as the presumption circuits, but the results were still strongly indicative of a Guidelines-focused approach to reasonableness review. These circuits-the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-reviewed 61 above-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants. The courts were extremely deferential in these circumstances, finding only 2 of the sentences unreasonable and affirming 59 sentences. There were 20 below-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants; the courts affirmed 7 of these sentences and reversed 13 sentences or approximately 65 percent. Of the remaining 459 within-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants, only 9 were vacated, each for procedural reasons. Table 2 shows the circuit-by-circuit breakdown for these courts of appeals. As we compiled the results from each circuit, we began to see that some circuits had results we described as more "non-parsimonious" than other circuits. 24 Interestingly, we discovered that the two circuits with some of the most extreme patterns of rigidly adhering to the Guidelines, except when considering sentences above the Guidelines, which were routinely affirmed, were the circuits from which the appeals in Rita and Claiborne arose.
Mr. Claiborne's case was appealed from the Eighth Circuit. The data from that circuit show that only 2 out of 118 within-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants were held unreasonable-1 for procedural reasons and 1 for substantive unreasonableness. There were 22 appeals by defendants of above-Guidelines sentences. Nearly all of these sentences-21-were affirmed; only 1 above-Guidelines sentence was found to be unreasonably high. In stark contrast, however, the Eighth Circuit found unreasonable and vacated 27 out of 28 below-Guidelines sentences that were appealed by the government. 25 Thus, the Eighth Circuit was extremely deferential to sentences above the Guidelines range but intolerant of sentences below the Guidelines range. The data also show that the Eighth Circuit affirmed at least 9 sentences that imposed imprisonment terms more than double the bottom of the advisory range, including one in which the bottom was nearly tripled. 26 In at least 8 cases, the Eighth Circuit affirmed sentences that added 5 or more years of imprisonment to the bottom of the Guidelines range. 27 By contrast, the court has declared unreasonable at least 13 downward variances of less than 5 years. 28 Mr. Rita's case arose in the Fourth Circuit-a presumption circuit-where all 201 within-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants were affirmed. Only a single sentence among 10 above-Guidelines sentences appealed by defendants was found unreasonable. On the other hand, all 9 below-Guidelines sentences appealed by the government were held unreasonable and vacated.
C. Post-Amicus Brief Update of Results
For purposes of this article, we updated the Eighth and Fourth Circuit databases (from the closing date of NYCDL's database, November 16, 2006 , through January 10, 2007 to investigate whether the cert grants have had any effect on the courts' pattern of review. 29 These new findings indicate that these courts have continued routinely to affirm within-and above-Guidelines sentences while reversing below-Guidelines sentences.
In the Eighth Circuit we identified 34 cases. All 16 involving within-Guidelines sentences were affirmed. One below-Guidelines sentence was appealed by the defendant, and his appeal was rejected. Every one of the 4 aboveGuidelines sentences appealed by defendants was affirmed as reasonable. Moreover, these 4 upward variances involved increases from the bottom of the Guidelines range of 50 percent, 56 percent, 42 percent, and 131 percent. 30 There were also 13 below-Guidelines sentences appealed by the government-and the Eighth Circuit reversed 12 of these as unreasonable. The court let stand 1 below-Guidelines sentence, uncharacteristically disagreeing with the government's position. In United States v. Wadena, the defendant's advisory-Guidelines range was 18 to 24 months' imprisonment. 31 The district court sentenced Wadena to 5 years' probation, based on the fact that the defendant was sixty-seven years old, suffered from kidney disease that required three hours of dialysis treatments three times per week, and was the sole caretaker of an adopted adult son who suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome. According to the district court, these factors reduced the risk that the defendant would recidivate. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, stating that "we ultimately find that the sentence was reasonable because a number of factors, taken together, justify the district court's decision to sentence Wadena to five years' probation." 32 Adding this recent information to the database shows that the Eighth Circuit has reversed only 1 out of 134 (0.75 percent) within-Guidelines sentences as substantively unreasonable. It has also affirmed 25 out of 26 (96 percent) above-Guidelines sentences and reversed 39 out of 41 (95 percent) below-Guidelines sentences appealed by the government.
In the Fourth Circuit, we identified 38 cases decided since the close of NYCDL's database. Each of the 3 aboveGuidelines sentences was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. In 1 of the cases, a sentence 3 times the high end of the Guidelines range was affirmed. 33 In another case, the sentence was more than 7 times the bottom of the Guidelines range. 34 There were also 3 below-Guidelines sentences, each of which was appealed by the defendant, and each of which was affirmed. The remaining 32 cases reviewed were within-Guidelines sentences. Consistent with the Fourth Circuit's pattern, it affirmed all of these cases. Thus, of all cases since January 1, 2006, the Fourth Circuit has reviewed and affirmed all 233 within-Guidelines sentences it has reviewed. Interestingly, we discovered that in nearly half (15 cases) of the 32 within-Guidelines sentences reviewed in our supplemental database, defense counsel filed an Anders brief certifying that, in counsel's opinion, there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. 35 The Commission has found that in the last six months, district courts have imposed non-Guidelines sentences less frequently. 36 Now, at least in the Fourth Circuit, there is some evidence that even counsel are capitulating and certifying that appeals of within-Guidelines sentences are frivolous. The updated findings in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits continue to support NYCDL's argument that the courts of appeals are applying reasonableness review in a manner inconsistent with Section 3553(a)'s requirement that district courts impose sentences "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to comply with the purposes of sentencing, and that appellate courts review these sentences with reference to Section 3553(a)'s mandate. ***
Conclusions
The data provide powerful evidence that the mandate of Section 3553(a) is not being followed and raise serious questions about whether the principles behind the Booker constitutional majority opinion are being effectively carried out by a remedy that treats the Guidelines as advisory. Although the government may be somewhat more selective than most defendants in determining which sentences to appeal, it is highly improbable that this selectivity could explain why only one within-Guidelines sentence out of over 1,500 was reversed, or the vast differences between the reversal rates of below-and above-Guidelines sentences. 37 And it certainly cannot explain why the Fourth and Eighth Circuit in particular have so consistently affirmed aboveGuidelines sentences that are double and even triple the bottom of the Guidelines range. The principles that drove the constitutional Booker decision are certainly in tension with a system of de facto mandatory guidelines. The data suggest that while Rita and Claiborne are pending-and the Supreme Court confronts the issue of whether the courts of appeals have created such a de facto system-there is unlikely to be any change in the current patterns, and the Guidelines will continue to be the central factor in sentencing decisions. 24-9:24, Aug. 10, 2006 , available at http://www.fd.org/ HartleyTranscript8.10.06 ("The Court: [T] he Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . has established a pretty rigid view that the guidelines are not only presumptively reasonable, but the requirement is that in order to sentence outside the guidelines, you have to show that the guideline sentence is in some fashion unreasonable it almost seems."). 37, 53 (2006) ("Nearly two years' worth of experience with advisory guidelines has shown that the Booker remedy has succeeded in keeping judges empowered and juries marginal in the federal sentencing system. In the wake of Booker, federal judges continue to do all the fact-finding that the advisory guidelines recommend according to the same old lax sentencing procedures."). See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 313 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("Will appellate review for 'unreasonableness' preserve de facto mandatory Guidelines by discouraging district courts from sentencing outside Guidelines ranges? . . . [W] ill it be a mere formality, used by busy appellate judges only to ensure that busy district judges say all the right things when they explain how they have exercised their newly restored discretion? Time may tell, but today's remedial majority will not."); United
